Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 50

Issue 3

Article 6

1962

Modern Scientific Evidence by James R. Richardson
Dan E. Fowler
Fowler, Rouse, Measle and Bell

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Fowler, Dan E. (1962) "Modern Scientific Evidence by James R. Richardson," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol.
50: Iss. 3, Article 6.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol50/iss3/6

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information,
please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

Book Reviews
c EVIDENCE. By James R. Richardson. W. H. Anderson Co., Cincinnati, 1961. Table of cases, author index, subject index, pocket supplement. xvi, 538 pp. $20.00.

MODERN ScmnIFI

Professor Richardson* has added another volume to his growing
shelf of valuable practitioners' references.' This latest endeavor, Modern Scientific Evidence, however, reveals not only the trial tactician,
but the theoretician and the academician as well. Despite the dmbitious scope of the book indicated by the title, Professor Richardson
has found room not only to cover his subject comprehensively from
the practicing attorneys viewpoint, but to lucidly and briefly spell out
the constitutional and jurisprudential questions underlying evidentiary
issues of the scientific variety. Having exceeded thus far the mechanics of trial, he goes the scholarly extra mile, outlining his own
positions and the arguments buttressing them, on the policies and
philosophy of evidence law.
In the first seven chapters the author definitively covers the history,
underlying policies, procedural aspects, tactical and strategic concepts,
and the constitutional overtones (and dangers) of scientific evidence.
Warmly welcoming the aid of science to the judicial fact-finding
process, the author is nonetheless greatly perturbed by the economic
inequality thus interjected into both civil and criminal litigation. One
of Richardson's solutions is to remove scientific evidence from its
adversary surroundings and neutralize it through court appointed
experts and panels of experts. This solution does not meet all objections. If all other expert testimony is to be excluded, there arise serious
questions of due process. If party-initiated expert evidence is also to
be allowed, there are questions of weight and conclusiveness. Many
scientific results are validly open to biased interpretation due to the
inexactness of the "science" involved, e.g., psychiatric findings, questioned documents. Also public agencies, supposedly neutral, often
become partisan offices as in the case of criminal prosecutors and
various administrative bodies. Again, court-appointed or selected ex* Member of the Kentucky Bar; Professor of Law, University of Kentucky
College of Law.
1 Florida Jury Instructions, West Pub. Co., 1954; Florida Law and Practice,
Harrison Co., 1955; Kentucky Practice Methods (Kentucky Practice, vols. 8-5),
West Pub. Co., 1957; Establishing a Law Practice, Lawyers Co-operative Pub.
Co., 1958; The Trial jury, University Press (forthcoming).
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perts might tend to reflect the bias of a prosecution-minded or
defendant-favoring court (the latter being, admittedly, a natural and
inescapable hazard facing any party litigant, but one which ought
not be carried over into the realm of expert evidence). In respect to
expert testimony involving the less exact sciences, the suggested solution appears to create more problems than it solves, although there is
certainly no serious argument to the procedure where the more exact
or mathematical sciences are involved, such as photography, fingerprinting, blood group analysis, ballistics and others. But even here,
as Professor Richardson well points out, the proper laying of foundation, qualifications of the expert, validity of procedures, identification
and history of samples, etc., are always open to attack by proper cross
examination and rebuttal evidence.
In the last fifteen chapters, the author covers the fundamentals of
individual scientific methods of proof: psychiatry; speed detection;
polygraph; narcoanalysis; blood grouping; intoxication; wire-tapping;
recording; photographs, x-rays and motion pictures; ballistics; fingerprints; questioned documents; maps, plats and diagrams; models and
casts; and miscellaneous tests (electroencephalograms, cardiograms,
dermal nitrate, nalline, Zondek-Aseheim tests, and blood dynamics).
Naturally, no one author could qualify expertly in every phase of
scientific evidence, and certainly no exhaustive treatment of the field
could be contained in a single-volume treatise. Nevertheless, the practitioner will find almost uniformly broad coverage of every important
area, including restrictions and qualifications on admissability, the laying of foundations, qualifications of the expert witness, standards
required of and validity of tests and experiments, and the many
individual factors pertinent to successful proof of facts. For those
requiring or seeking analysis in depth, there are numerous citations
to the primary authorities in each field. In addition there is discussion
and analysis of the leading case law in each field. The only technical
omission found in the work pertained to the genetic conclusiveness
of blood grouping tests in excluding paternity. Recent work indicates
that the blood grouping tests may not be so iron-clad in excluding
paternity after all, due to a possible mutation factor and the statistical
distortion of parties involved in bastardy and support proceedings.
Otherwise, the author has done his homework well.
If an author's philosophy can fairly be capsulized, then Professor
Richardson must be labeled an evidentiary "liberal" who favors opening the courtroom door wider to scientific evidence. He follows Dean
Wigmore's view in favoring the restrictive theory of the privilege
against self-incrimination. He condemns the unfounded judicial prej-
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udice toward evidence such as polygraph results and argues that the
usual test of scientific evidence ought to be the standard of admissabiity: "Any relevant conclusions, which are supported by a qualified
expert witness, in a field finding substantial scientific acceptance
should be admitted in evidence, for its probative value... in the light
of all the circumstances." He urges the courts to extend judicial notice
to the basic premises of the proven and matured sciences, e.g., the law
of probabilities in fingerprinting is tacitly acknowledged; in forgery
comparison of typewriters, it is not. Only when he approaches the
admissability issue from the direction of due process and selfincrimination limitations do Professor Richardson's footsteps falterperhaps on the theory that fools rush in, etc. He, along with the courts
and the writers, is hard put to draw the fine line of due process (not
to be confused with Justice Frankfurter's plimsoll line and slippery
slope) between permissably requiring a defendant to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, line-ups, voice and handwriting identification, etc., and the dangers of compulsory body fluid tests, narcoanalysis,
polygraph interrogation, stomach pumping and enemas. Perhaps in
this era of accelerating technology there is no satisfactory answer. This
same acceleration also has created a gap in legal literature which,
however, has been competently filled by Modern Scientific Evidence,
a primer which should render yeoman service to every trial attorney.
Dan E. Fowler*
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